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ARISTOTLE’S SQUARE OF OPPOSITION IN THE LIGHT OF
HILBERT’S EPSILON AND TAU QUANTIFIERS
FABIO PASQUALI AND CHRISTIAN RETOR ´E
ABSTRACT. Aristotle considered particular quantified sentences in his
study of syllogisms and in his famous square of opposition. Of course,
the logical formulas in Aristotle work were not modern formulas of
mathematical logic, but ordinary sentences of natural language. Nowa-
days natural language sentences are turned into formulas of predicate
logic as defined by Frege, but, it is not clear that those Fregean sen-
tences are faithful representations of natural language sentences. Indeed,
the usual modelling of natural language quantifiers does not fully corre-
spond to natural language syntax, as we shall see. This is the reason why
Hilbert’s epsilon and tau quantifiers (that go beyond usual quantifiers)
have been used to model natural language quantifiers. Here we interpret
Aristotle quantified sentences as formulas of Hilbert’s epsilon and tau
calculus. This yields to two potential squares of opposition and provided
a natural condition holds, one of these two squares is actually a square
of opposition i.e. satisfies the relations of contrary, contradictory, and
subalternation.
1. ARISTOTLE I A E O SENTENCES:
THE STANDARD INTERPRETATION AND ITS INADEQUACIES
When studying syllogisms and in his square of opposition, Aristotle con-
sidered 4 kinds of quantified sentences (see e.g. [8]):
A Every S is P Universal Affirmative
I Some S is P Particular Affirmative
E No S is P Universal Negative
O Not all S are P Particular negative
O formulas are different from the others: as observed e.g. in [6] no hu-
man language possesses a single word for saying ”not every” or ”not all”
— at least in the language for which this question was asked. Nowadays,
O formulas are expressed by Some S are not P, and this induces a change
of focus, from the global set of S entities (which gets out of P), to some
particular entities in S (that are out of P):
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(1) Not all students may park their car on the campus.
(2) Some students may not park their car on the campus.
1.1. Standard Montagovian modelling of quantifiers. Aristotle used to
express quantified formulas in natural language, and, from a syntactic point
of view, there are two different kinds of quantifiers:
(3) Something happened to me yesterday.
(4) Some girls give me money.
The first kind has an explicit domain, the restriction, which is a one-
place predicate; the second kind of quantifiers does not have an explicit
restriction, but they all have an implicit domain: because of their nature (e.g.
everything does not range over human beings) or because of the linguistic
and extra-linguistic context. As opposed to Frege’s quantifiers for predicate
logic natural language quantifiers do not range over a single sorted universe
of first order entities (for instance everything may range over higher order
objects, like t in : ”He believes everything”).
In the standard compositional, formal, and computable view of semantics
introduced by Montague [11, 12] formulas are represented by first order
lambda terms over two base types e (entities) and t (propositions) as Church
did. [4] N-ary predicates are constants of the lambda calculus of type: e→
(· · · → (e→ t) (N times e). Binary connectives &,⊃,∨, ... are constants of
type t→ (t→ t). Quantifiers apply to predicates to give a proposition, thus
their type is (e→ t)→ t and when there is a restriction to a class (e.g. some)
the quantifier applies to two predicates to give a proposition, thus its type is
(e→ t)→ (e→ t)→ t. Here are their precise definitions.
something ∃(e→t)→t of type (e→ t)→ t)
everything ∀(e→t)→t of type (e→ t)→ t)
some λPe→t λQe→t (∃(e→t)→t (λxe(&t→(t→t)(P x)(Q x)))) of type
(e→ t)→ ((e→ t)→ t)
every λPe→t λQe→t (∀(e→t)→t (λxe(⊃t→(t→t) (P x)(Q x)))) of type
(e→ t)→ ((e→ t)→ t)
1.2. Inadequacies of the standard solution. There are basically three prob-
lems with this approach (see e.g. [14]):
(1) This view of quantifiers does not distinguish any exchange between
the main predicate (rheme) and the domain predicate (theme). Alas
it is clear that the two statements have a different meaning as their
focuses are different.
(5) a. Some politicians are crooks.
b. ?? Some crooks are politicians.
(6) a. Some students are employees.
b. Some employees are students.
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(2) The correspondence between syntax and semantics, that is the core
of compositional semantics is lost. Indeed, in the following example
the underlined predicate does not correspond to a syntactic subtree
(i.e. a constituent, a phrase), the syntactic structure and the semantic
structure are different.
(7) Keith composed some hits.
(8) syntax (Keith (composed (some (hits))))
(9) semantics: (some (hits)) (λx. Keith composed x)
(3) Interpretation of noun phrases and nominal phrases is difficult: in-
deed the interpretation of a noun phrase should be an entity, an in-
dividual, a term, i.e. should be of type e, and in case the main
predicate is absent, as in nominal sentences, the standard approach
is not satisfactory, because it yields a type raised entity i.e. a term of
type (e→ t)→ t. We indeed need a reference, before the utterance
of the main predicate (if any):
(10) A goat!
(11) My thumb instead of an onion. (S. Plath)
2. HILBERT’S EPSILON AND TAU QUANTIFIERS
Hilbert introduced in [9] a logic with in situ 1 quantifiers in order to es-
tablish the consistency of arithmetics and analysis.
A term (of type individual) εxF(x) is associated with every formula with
F(x) and the operator ε binds all the free occurrences of x in F — such
operators are called subnectors in [5]. The meaning is that as soon as an
entity enjoys F( ) the term εxF(x) enjoys F( ):
F(εxF(x))≡ ∃x. F(x)
Writing x in F(x) is unnecessary, indeed the variable x may not appear
in F and their could be other variables. But it is a convenient notation, and
furthermore x usually appears in F .
There is a dual subnector: τxF(x) for which
F(τxF(x))≡ ∀x. F(x)
Terms and formulae are defined by mutual recursion:
• Any constant in L is a term.
• Any variable in L is a term.
• f (t1, . . . , tp) is a term provided each ti is a term and f is a function
symbol of L of arity p
• εxA is a term if A is a formula and x a variable — any free occurrence
of x in A is bound by εx
1as one says about interrogative pronouns in Chinese that do not move to the beginning
of the sentence
4 FABIO PASQUALI AND CHRISTIAN RETOR ´E
• τxA is a term if A is a formula and x a variable — any free occurrence
of x in A is bound by τx
• s = t is a formula whenever s and t are terms.
• R(t1, . . . , tn) is a formula provided each ti is a term and R is a relation
symbol of L of arity n
• A&B, A∨B, A⇒ B, ¬A when A and B are formulae.
What are the proof rules for these termes, i.e. for quantification, in the
epsilon calculus? They are the usual rules for quantification. From a proof
of P(x) whose hypotheses do not concern x (there are no free occurrences
of x in any hypothesis) infer P(τx.P(x)).
From a proof of P(x) whose hypotheses do not concern x (there are no
free occurrences of x in any hypothesis) infer P(τx.P(x)). From P(τx.P(x))
one may infer P(t) for any term t. From P(t) infer P(εxP(x)). (the elimina-
tion rule for epsilon is slightly tricky we prefer not to give it, however the
first rule together with the second one or the third one are enough)
It is common (and sound) to add, in this variant of classical logic, a rule
εx.F(x) = τx.¬F(x) . Indeed, the above deduction rules above shows that
P(εxP(x)) ≡ ¬¬P(τx¬P(x)) and P(τxP(x)) ≡ ¬¬P(εx¬P(x)). Hence one
of the two subnectors ε and τ is enough, and usually people choose ε .
The quantifier free epsilon calculus is a strict conservative extension of
first order logic. For more details on the epsilon calculus, quantification
and natural language the reader is referred to [10, 15, 2, 1, 7, 14]. The
reader must be aware that there is no natural notion of model that interprets
epsilon terms as usual first order terms or as choice functions: completeness
fails, and this expected first order and higher order logic cannot provide an
account of the epsilon calculus.
3. A I E O SENTENCES WITH EPSILON AND TAU
The I sentences, some S is P can be translated by P(εx. S(x)) as von
Heusinger and other did [7, 14]. It is not equivalent to any ordinary formula
of first or higher-order predicate calculus, and in particular it is not equiv-
alent to the standard: ∃x. S(x)&P(x). Nevertheless this formula has some
relation with some usual formulas: 2
P(εx. S(x)) & ∃x.S(x) ⊢ ∃x. (S(x)&P(x))
∃x.S(x) & ∀y(S(y)⇒ P(y)) ⊢ P(εx.S(x))
That way, all the three aforementioned inadequacies vanish:
(1) S(εx.P(x)) 6≡ P(εx.S(x)) hence the asymmetry is reflected in the
semantic representation
(2) The interpretation is ((composed(εx.motet(x)))orlando) and fol-
lows the syntactic structure.
2 A ⊢ B means A entails B and A ⊣⊢ B is a short hand for A ⊢ B and B ⊢ A.
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(3) εx.goat(x) is a term of type e as expected for a noun phrase —
the presupposition goat(εx.goat(x) can be added in the context, be-
cause when someone says ”a goat” there must be one, at least in his
mind!
The A formula every S is P can be stated as the I formula some S is
P using τ instead of ε: P(τx. S(x)) The two other formulas E and O are
simply the negations of I and A respectively:
A Every S is P P(τx.S(x)) P(τS) AS,P
I Some S is P P(εx.S(x)) P(εS) IS,P
E No S is P ¬P(εx.S(x))≡ ¬P(τx.¬S(x)) ¬P(εS) ES,P
O Some S are not P ¬P(τx.S(x))≡ ¬P(εx.¬S(x)) ¬P(τS) OS,P
The two last columns define some useful abbreviations (because the pred-
icates have no more than one free variable we do not need to specify the
name of the variables that are bound by τ and ε).
4. TWO HILBERTIAN SQUARES,
ONE OF WHICH IS AN ARISTOTELIAN SQUARE OF OPPOSITION
As an ongoing series of conference shows, the square of Aristotle is of
a lasting interest. Since Aristotle use to study logic with natural language
sentences and not with logical formulae it is important that our new inter-
pretation of quantified natural language sentences A E I O define a square
of opposition for instance that contradictory sentences are logically contra-
dictory. This possibility is mentioned in [16].
Definition 1. A square of opposition (see e.g. [16, 13] is given by four well
formed formulas A, E, I, O such that: 3
i) A ⊣⊢ ¬O and E ⊣⊢ ¬I
ii) It is never the case that ⊤ ⊢ A and ⊤ ⊢ E
iii) It is never the case that I ⊢ ⊥ and E ⊢ ⊥
iv) A ⊢ I and E ⊢ O
Remark 2. Note that condition iii is redundant, since it is derivable from i
and ii. Also one of the conditions in iv is deducible from the other and from
i.
Formulas A and O and formulas E and I are said to be contradictory, since
one holds exactly when the other doesn’t. By (ii) formulas A and E can not
be simultaneously true, thus they are said to be contraries. Conversely I
and O cannot be simultaneously false, then they are called subcontraries. A
proposition X is said to be a subaltern of another proposition Y when the
truth of X implies the truth of Y (and some authors add that the falsity of Y
implies the falsity of X ).
3 A ⊢ B means A entails B and A ⊣⊢ B is a short hand for A ⊢ B and B ⊢ A.
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The usual diagrammatical representation is
A−contrarysubalternshh
((PP
PP
PP
PP
PP
PP
PP
PP
PP
PP
PP
PP
PP
PP
PP
P
oo //

Esubalterns

Isubcontrary
vv
66♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥
oo // O
The motivating idea is that a term of the form εP is a witness of the fact
that P holds, so it makes sense to think at Q(εP) as ”Some Q are P”. Nev-
ertheless, since the Hilbert’s ε-calculus is classic, i.e the law of excluded
middle holds, we have that ⊤ ⊢ P∨¬P. Then we might expect that one
term among εP and ε¬P is a witness ”better” then the other. This is made
more precise by the following proposition.
We say that P is bivalent with respect to S whenever P(εS) ⊢ P(τS) or
P(τS) ⊢ P(εS) — observe that in the square case S is a unary predicates,
so the definition of bivalence only involves sentences i.e. formulae without
free variables. The term bivalent comes from the fact that when P is bivalent
(i.e. forall x ⊢ P(x) or ⊢ ¬P(x)) P is bivalent wrt any S.
Denote by Sq(S,P) the square obtained with the following figures:
AS,P, IS,P, ES,P, OS,P.
Denote by S (S,P) the square obtained with the following figures: AS,P,
IS,P, ES,P and OS,P.
Proposition 3. If P is bivalent with respect to S then either S (S,P) or
S (S,¬P) is a square of opposition.
That is to say that, using standard diagrams, in the Hilbert’s ε-calculus
one of the following is a square of opposition
P(τS)
cc
##❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋
oo //

¬P(εS)

P(εS)
{{
;;①①①①①①①①①①①①①①①①①①
oo // ¬P(τS)
P(τ¬S)
dd
$$❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
oo //

6 P(ε¬S)

P(ε¬S)
{{
;;✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈
oo // ¬P(τ¬S)
Proof. Suppose P(τS) ⊢ P(εS).
Contradictories: Diagonals are contradictories by construction.
Subalterns: these coincide exactly with the assumption that P(τS) ⊢
P(εS).
Contrary: We have to prove that P(τS) and ¬P(εS) cannot be both
true. Suppose they are both true, i.e.
(1) ⊤ ⊢ P(τS)
(2) ⊤ ⊢ ¬P(εS)
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By (1) we have ⊤ ⊢ P(τS) ⊢ P(εS) which contradicts (2).
Subcontrary: we have to prove that P(εS) and¬P(τS) cannot be both
false. This comes for free by negating contraries.
The other case, i.e id P(τ¬S) ⊢ P(ε¬S) is analogous.

5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This study of the reformulation of the A E I O sentences with epsilon is
particularly appealing both from a linguistic view point and from a logical
one. Even for those very simple sentences, it is hard to grasp the intuitive
meaning of the epsilon formulae that are not equivalent to first order formu-
lae and their relation to standard formulae.
Regarding the square itself and its symmetries, one may wonder how the
square generalises with a typed epsilon that either acts directly on types or
on predicates that apply to a given type.
The proof that our square are square of opposition relies on a strong ver-
sion of tertium non datur, and we wonder what happens with the intuition-
istic variants of epsilon that were studied by Bell [3].
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